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THE INTEREST OF MORTGAGORS AND MORTGAGEES
IN FIRE INSURANCE POLICIES
The purpose of this comment is to trace the development of the
law of insurance as it pertains to the interests of mortgagors and
mortgagees in fire insurance policies, with a discussion of the various
types of mortgage clauses, Article 6.15 of the Texas Insurance Code,
and subrogation aspects involved.
TYPES OF MORTGAGE CLAUSES

The first clause put into an insurance policy for the purpose of
protecting the security of a creditor was what is known as the
simple or open mortgage clause. In case of loss or damage to the
insured property, such a clause simply instructed the insurance company to pay the proceeds due under the policy to the mortgagee,
as his interest might appear. Almost without dissent the courts of
this country have held that the effect of such a clause is merely
to designate the mortgagee appointee of the funds which would
in the absence of the mortgage clause be payable to the mortgagor
or owner; the result is that anything rendering the policy void in
the hands of the mortgagor in the same manner defeats any rights
the mortgagee had under the policy.! This is true because there is
no privity of contract between the mortgagee and the insurance
company under such a clause, hence the mortgagee must recover
solely through his mortgagor by showing that the mortgagor has
abided by the conditions of his policy.'
Apparently the possible injustices to the mortgagee under the
open mortgagee clause brought about the introduction of the standard or union mortgage clause. The latter clause is usually worded to
the effect that any loss under the policy shall be payable to the mortgagee as his interest may appear and further that the interest of
the mortgagee shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of
the mortgagor or owner of the property. In the vast majority of
jurisdictions the courts have held that the clause operates as independent insurance of the mortgagee's interest, creating a separate
and distinct contract between the insurance company and the mortgagee.a
1Hamburg-Bremen

Fire Ins. Co. v. Ruddell,

82 S.W. 826

(Tex. Civ. App.

1904);

29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 552 (1940); Annot., 38 A.L.R. 367 (1925).
'Franklin Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 23 Ind.App. 549, 54 N.E. 772 (1899); Inland Finance
Co. v. Homes Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 485, 236 Pac. 73 (1925).
aGeorgia Home Ins. Co. v. Golden, 127 Tex. 93, 91 S.W.2d 695 (1936); Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Harold E. Clayton and Co., 117 Tex. 414, 6 S.W.2d 1029 (1928);
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The courts which follow the minority rule hold that a separate
contract between the mortgagee and the insurance company is not

created by the standard mortgage clause; such courts apply a third
party beneficiary theory, stating that the mortgage clause constitutes

the mortgagee a third party beneficiary.' The distinction, however,
would seem to be little more than technical because under either
rule the courts have given almost complete protection to the mortgagee from acts and neglects of the mortgagor.
Under the independent contract construction of the standard
mortgage clause most jurisdictions hold that the mortgagee is protected from acts and neglects of the mortgagor occuring both prior

and subsequent to the issuance of the policy as well as prior and
subsequent to the loss.' Applying this rule, the Court in Georgia
Home Ins. Co. v. Golden8 held that even though the policy was
void in its inception as to the mortgagor, the mortgagee was not
precluded from recovery. In that case, the mortgagor knew at the
time he purchased the policy that the insured premises was to be
burned down, but the mortgagee was ignorant of the fraud.
When the mortgagor takes out a fire policy on the mortgaged
premises with the standard mortgage clause in favor of the mortgagee, the mortgagee thereby gains a vested interest in the policy.
The act of the mortgagor in tearing up the original policy and having
the insurer issue another not protecting the mortgagee is not effective to defeat the rights of the mortgagee under the first policy
because the mortgagee cannot be deprived of his vested interest in
the first policy without his consent.' In the Security Co. v. Panhandle Nat'l Bank' case the Court in holding that the mortgagee
has juch a vested interest overruled finally the argument that the
mortgagor owns the property minus only the mortgagee's lien and
therefore should be able to control the insurance policy covering
the mortgaged premises.
BACKGROUND

AND

CONSTRUCTION

OF ARTICLE

6.15

The predecessor of Article 6.15," Article 4931, Texas Revised
Rio Grande Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Boston Ins. Co. v. Rainwater,
118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Feldman v. Costa, 171 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ.
error ref. w.o.m.; Vance, INSURANCE S 130 (3d ed.); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance S
24e Tex. Jur., Insurance § 392 (1956); Annot., 45 A.L.R. 598 (1926).
4See, e.g., Walker v. Queen Ins. Co.,-S.C. 144, 134 S.E. 263 (1926).
See note 3, supra.
'127
Tex. 93, 91 S.W.2d 695 (1936).
7
Security Co. v. Panhandle Nat'l Bank, 93 Tex. 575, 57 S.W. 22 (1900).
8 Ibid.
'Tex. Ins. Code art. 6.15 (1951).

209 S.W.2d
197 S.W.2d
App. 1943)
553 (1940);
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Civil Statutes (1926), stated in substance that " . . . any act of
neglect of the mortgagee or owner" shall not invalidate the interest
of the mortgagee in the policy. In Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Harold
E. Clayton and Co." the mortgagor took out a fire insurance policy
on his car, which policy contained a loss payable clause in favor of
the mortgagee. Subsequently, the mortgagor took out another policy
on the car, violating the "other insurance" clause of the original
policy and rendering it void as to the mortgagor. The automobile
was destroyed by fire and the mortgagee sued under the loss payable
clause of the original policy. He was allowed to recover. The Court
interpreted Article 4931 to mean "any act or neglect of the mortgagor." Under this construction of Article 4931, the Court concluded that the acts of the mortgagor invalidating the original policy
could not invalidate the interest of the mortgagee in the policy.
In 1951 Article 6.15 was promulgated for the purpose of codifying the holding of the Camden case, interpreting Article 4931.
Article 6.15 provides:
The interest of a mortgagee or trustee under any fire insurance contract hereafter issued covering any property situated in this state shall
not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of
said described property or the happening of any condition beyond his
control, and any stipulation in any contract in conflict herewith shall
be null and void.
Article 6.15 is incorporated by operation of law, even if not expressly incorporated, in all fire insurance policies on any property
situated within the State of Texas where the policy purports to
insure the combined interest of the mortgagee and the mortgagor."
Article 6.15 creates a separate and independent contract between
the mortgagee and the insurance company, the validity of which
depends solely on the acts of the mortgagee." The following quotation from the case of Rio Grande Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.," which interprets Article 4931, is relevant
because Article 6.15 is a restatement of the judicial interpretations
of Article 4931:
The statute covers two things against which an insurance company
is not permitted to contract as affecting the mortgagee. They are (1)
any act or neglect of the mortgagor and (2) the happening of any con"o117 Tex. 414, 6 S.W.2d 1029 (1928).
"Feldman v. Costa,. 171 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.
"Citizens State Bank v. American Fire and Cas. Co., 198 F.2d. 57 (5th Cir. 1952);
note 3, supra.
s 209 S.W.2d. 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
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dition that is beyond the control of the mortgagee and it places no burden whatever upon him.
By applying the separate and independent contract theory, the
mortgagee's rights under the policy remain unaffected by certain
acts of the mortgagor. For example, if the mortgagor obtains a
policy by fraud so that it is void as to his interest, the mortgagee's
rights under the policy are not affected unless the mortgagee has
knowledge of the fraud.' 4 Also, if a subsequent purchaser of the
mortgaged property procures new insurance in violation of the
"other insurance" clause of the policy taken by his grantor,
the
rights of the mortgagee under the original policy are not destroyed
and recovery has been allowed to the extent of one-half from each
company. 5 If the insurance company and the mortgagor make a
settlement, the mortgagee's rights under the policy are not destroyed
in the absence of his knowledge of and consent to the settlement.'"
From these instances it is clear that only the acts of the mortgagee
himself can affect or destroy the separate and independent contract
created by Article 6.15 between the mortgagee and the insurance
company.
The separate and independent contract theory also has effect upon
the operation of other clauses of the policy. An example is the situation where the mortgagee acquires title to the mortgaged property
through a forced or voluntary sale. Then the change of ownership
provision of the policy does not affect the mortgagee's rights under
the policy, even though no notice of change of ownership is given."
The reason for this result is that the change in ownership is merely
regarded as an increase in the mortgagee's interest and not a change
in ownership as contemplated by the policy.
SUBROGATION

ASPECTS INVOLVED

Where the mortgagee takes out a fire insurance policy on the
mortgaged property at his own expense and covering only his interest, it is generally held that the insurance company, on paying
the mortgagee an amount at least equal to the amount of the mortgage debt, is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against the
'"Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Golden,
15Union

127 Tex. 93, 91 S.W.2d. 695 (1936).
Assurance Soc'y Ltd. v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 Tex. 618, 94 S.W.2d. 1151

(1936).
" Scottish Union and Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Field, 18 Colo.App. 68, 70 Pac. 149 (1902);
29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 1253 (1940); Annot., 38 A.L.R. 388 (1925).
17Ft. Scott Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Palatine Ins. Co., 74 Kan. 272, 86 Pac. 142 (1906);
29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 651 (1940); Annot., 45 A.L.R. 599 (1926).
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mortgagor.18 Such a rule should not be stated, however, without
mentioning the holding in Kost v. Resolute Underwriters of Rhode
Island Ins. Co." In that case, the mortgagee took out a fire insurance
policy covering only his interest. Loss then occurred, the insured
property being partially destroyed, after which the mortgagor rebuilt. The mortgagee then assigned his rights under the policy to the
mortgagor, who brought suit against the insurer. The insurance company previously had denied liability to the mortgagee, presumably
because the mortgagee sustained no loss since the mortgagor had rebuilt. The insurance company argued the defense of circuity of
actions, i.e., that the assignment destroyed the right of subrogation
they would have had if they had paid the mortgagee. The policy
here involved was on the standard three party form but as written
covered only the mortgagee's interest. The court held in favor of
the mortgagor, saying that the defenses set up by the company would
under proper circumstances be good against the mortgagor where
the three party contract was involved. These defenses, said the court,
were allowed to alleviate the harshness of what is now Article 6.15,
which puts a heavy burden on the insurer under a three party contract by making it liable to the mortgagee regardless of the wrongful
conduct of the named insured, the mortgagor. When the insurer has
to pay the mortgagee under such a contract, the courts then allow
the company to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against
the mortgagor if the mortgagor has breached policy provisions so
that he no longer has any rights under the policy. Here, the court
said only the mortgagee and the insurance company were parties to
the contract with the result that Article 6.15 was not applicable.
The court was impressed by the fact that if the insurer were not
liable to the mortgagor, it had incurred no liability, yet had received premiums. The point is that language in the case could be
cited for the proposition that the insurer will have no right of subrogation where the two part contract-mortgagee, insurance company-is involved.
It is submitted, however, that the effect of the case should be
limited to these peculiar facts and that the insurer should have
subrogation rights under these two party contracts except where it
has denied liability to the mortgagee because of some fact which does
not void the policy, such as the mortgagor's repairing the property.
1"Phoenix

Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 Va. 765, 8 S.E. 719 (1889);

Monumental Say. and Loan Ass'n, 58 W. Va. 408, 52 S.E. 403
Insurance § 1351 (1940).
'9211 S.W.2d. 758 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error dism.

(1905);

Baker v.

29 Am. Jur.,
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In the Kost case the court seemed to feel that since no policy provisions had been breached and the policy was still in effect, the insurance company ought to pay someone.
Different problems arise where the policy is issued at the request
and expense of the mortgagor when the policy also purports to cover
the interest of the mortgagee. In such a case subrogation did not
exist under the old simple or open mortgage clause. The doctrine did
not apply because, as previously shown, the right of the mortgagee
to recover depended upon the mortgagor's fulfilling all conditions of
the policy. A breach by the mortgagor also defeated the right of the
mortgagee to recover under the open mortgage clause. If there was
no breach and the insurer paid the mortgagee, the insurer was not
subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee because the mortagor, not
having breached any of the provisions of the policy, was still an insured and entitled to receive the benefits of any payments made for
loss of the insured property."
The same rules but different considerations apply when the policy
contains the standard mortgage clause or a clause such as that provided in Article 6.15. Under such a clause in a policy procured by the
mortgagor, virtually all jurisdictions recognize that before the insurance company can be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee
upon paying him the amount of the loss, the mortgagor must have
no claim against the insurer under the policy.21 That is, the mortgagor
must have forfeited his rights under the policy so that he is no longer
an insured. This fundamental requirement was stated in Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co." in words to the effect that
where the insurance company has paid the mortgagee for loss by fire
to the mortgaged property, the right of subrogation depends on
whether the policy has been procured by fraud. If it has not been
so procured, the payment by the insurance company to the mortgagee
cancels and discharges the mortgage as fully as though it were paid
and discharged by the mortgagor himself. In other words, the insurance company's right of subrogation depends upon its legal liability
to the mortgagor.
Once it is determined that the mortgagor has forfeited all his
rights under the policy, thereby creating the possibility of subroga"°Burton Lingo Co. (Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, Intervenor) v. Patton, 15 N.M. 304,
107 Pac. 679 (1919); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1274 (1926).
21Girand Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 53 S.W.2d. 1015
(Tex. Comm. App.
1932); Home Ins. Co. v. Boatmer, 218 S.W. 1097 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), aff'd, 239
S.W. 928 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 163 S.W. 608
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 1352-53 (1940).
2098 Neb. 446, 153 N.W. 553 (1915).
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tion, the majority of jurisdictions hold that in the absence of a specific
provision in the policy for subrogation, the insurer will not be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee even after payment to him."'
These courts reason that the insurance is on the property; therefore,
the mortgagor or owner should get credit for any amount paid. The
cases which follow the minority rule hold that when the insurer pays
the mortgagee under a standard mortgage clause, it should be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights regardless of whether there is an express provision for subrogation in the insurance contract."
The effect of the majority rule in these cases is to make subrogation
depend entirely on contract and to deny that legal or equitable
subrogation is applicable to this type of case. The ultimate result, of
course, is that the mortgagor receives benefit from a policy under
which he is no longer an insured due to his own act or neglect. Such
an unjust result should be justification enough for applying the
doctrine of legal subrogation in favor of the insurer.
In seeking to hold the mortgagor under its subrogation rights,
the insurer must plead and prove a state of facts entitling it to subrogation. A mere claim of non-liability to the mortgagor apparently
is insufficient."
If the court determines that the right of subrogation exists in the
insurer, it is generally held to exist subject to the mortgagee's right to
recover the amount of the debt in full. This is especially true when
the mortgage clause provides that the subrogation rights therein
granted shall not impair the mortgagee's right to sue." In the case of
Lervold v. Republic Mitt. Fire Ins. Co.,27 the court construed the
phrase "shall not impair the mortgagee's right to sue" to mean the
mortgagee's right to recover was not to be impaired and held that the
insurance company's right of subrogation was subordinate to the right
of the mortgagee to recover in full.
" Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So. 806 (1930);
Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 76 Ore. 570, 149 Pac. 542 (1915); Fields
v. Western Millers Fire Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 209, 48 N.E.2d. 489 (1943); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance §§ 1352-53 (1940); 24e Tex. Jur., Insurance § 400 (1956); Annot., 146 A.L.R.
442 (1943).
"4First Nat'l Bank v. F. & M Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 278, 178 Pac. 413 (1919); Combs
v. American Ins. Co., 296 Ky. 535, 177 S.W.2d. 881 (1944). The Texas courts have
never definitely supported one rule or the other. However, the case of British Am. Assur.
Co. v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 37 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), does mention the
minority rule with favor even though the court indicated that the rule might go somewhat
further than they would wish to go.
2 Loewenstein v. Queens Ins. Co., 227 Mo. 100, 127 S.W. 72 (1910); New Biinswick
Fire Ins. Co. v. Girdner, 28 S.W.2d. 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance
§ 1353 (1940); 24B Tex. Jur., Insurance § 400 (1936); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 278 (1928).
26Lervold v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 142 Kan. 43, 45 P.2d. 839 (1935); Annot.,
106 A.L.R. 679 (1937).
27142 Kan. 43, 45 P.2d. 839 (1935).
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The Texas courts are in accord with the view expressed in the
Lervold case with at least one case that could be authority for the rule
that the insurance company can have no subrogation rights until the
mortgagee has been paid the full amount of the debt. 8
CONCLUSION

It may be said that the law on this subject is fairly well settled
with conflicts remaining in only a few areas. The problems and injustices that arose under the simple or open mortgage clause are cured
today by the provisions of Article 6.15 of the Texas Insurance Code,
which are incorporated into the Texas Standard Fire Insurance Policy
used by all insurers in the state.
Oscar Fields, Jr.

2National Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. The Praetorians, 67 S.W.2d. 333 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) error ref.; British Am. Assur. Co. v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 37 S.W.2d
742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).

